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Abstract Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology offers a new way of automating the
identification and storing of information in RFID tags. The emerging opportunities for the use
of RFID technology in human centric applications like monitoring and indoor guidance systems
indicate how important this topic is in term of privacy. Holding privacy issues from the early stages
of RFID data collection helps to master the data view before translating it into business events
and storing it in databases. An RFID middleware is the entity that sits between tag readers and
database applications. It is in charge of collecting, filtering and aggregating the requested events
from heterogeneous RFID environments. Thus, the system, at this point, is likely to suffer from
parameter manipulation and eavesdropping, raising privacy concerns. In this paper, we propose an
access and privacy controller module that adds a security level to the RFID middleware standard-
ized by the EPCglobal consortium. We provide a privacy policy-driven model using some enhanced
contextual concepts of the extended Role Based Access Control model, namely the purpose, the
accuracy and the consent principles. We also use the provisional context to model security rules
whose activation depends on the history of previously performed actions. To show the feasibility
of our privacy enforcement model, we first provide a proof-of-concept prototype integrated into
the middleware of the Fosstrak platform, then evaluate the performance of the integrated module
in terms of execution time.
Keywords RFID, Access control · Privacy Policy · Middleware · EPCglobal · Provisional context
1 Introduction
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) has emerged as a low-cost technology due to the use of
battery-less devices, known as passive tags. These devices can be attached or embedded in an item
to be identified and are read when they enter a RFID reader’s antenna field. The use of this technol-
ogy in healthcare services has grown in importance with the need of assisting people (e.g., elderly
individuals and patients) in their everyday life [24]. In this vein, the Auto-ID Center [34] created
the concept of a unique RFID code called Electronic Product Code (EPC). On the one hand, it
was shown that this technology significantly improves the visibility and accuracy of the logistic
operations [28], for example, critical errors such as prescribing wrong medicines can be avoided. On
the other hand, RFID technology helps providing patients some quality of care. For example, they
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can be applied to ensure a reminder system for elders, or to permanently assist patients suffering
from chronic diseases, who must travel regularly for minor typical examinations [24]. Although
the RFID technology offers several benefits, its human-centric deployment requires treating the
data in a privacy-conscious manner. In fact, once RFID tags carry more than just an identifier,
i.e, a bearer’s age or illnesses correlated with other information, bearer’s privacy may be violated.
RFID systems consist typically on tags, readers, and backend applications such as middlewares
and databases to manage and store the collected data. Here, we are interested in the backend side,
particularly the middleware component. This middleware sits between the reader and database
applications. It is in charge of collecting, filtering, aggregating and grouping the requested events
from heterogeneous RFID environments, then compiling them into well-formatted data prior to
send them to business application for usability e.g., typically by external applications, like the
EPC Discovery Service (EPCDS), in EPCglobal technology. Large amount of data handled by the
RFID middleware makes it attractive for malicious users to manipulate the parameters and access
sensitive data. In this article, we reuse the middleware properties and integrate additional filtering
and aggregation methods in the generated RFID data, for privacy goals and without interfering
with existing standards.
The privacy of people focuses today on who has access to what information, rather than what
information is accessed [42]. A major portion of previous work on privacy have been aligned on
anonymizing user information or on preventing personal information from disclosure, e.g, by en-
cryption means [8]. These works treat some issues of privacy but do not completely handle the
different situations where the data owner (i.e., the user who specifies a set of privacy preferences
on the usability of his data) chooses to share information with others. In addition, dealing with en-
crypted data in the middleware level makes the query process expensive, since not all the collected
data are sensitive, rather, the aggregation of some information may need to be protected.
Numerous reasons motivate the support of privacy issues in the RFID middleware. First, treat-
ing the privacy in the middleware helps to master the collection configuration and the data view
before interpreting and storing these data in upper layer applications. For example, let us consider
two distinct applications wanting to receive data about a patient. The first application is only
allowed to view the total tag count depending on the requester purpose, while the second one is
allowed to view the identity of tags but only of product of type “GTIN”. To treat the applications
requests, we propose to handle the privacy policy before the events are generated and transmitted
to database applications, since this minimizes, as soon as possible, the risk of unauthorized disclo-
sures. Second, filtering data for privacy issues in the middleware stage has the advantage to relax
the events to be collected in this stage, leading to an appropriate adaptation of the queries exe-
cuted by the reader on the tag over the air interface. This also allows readers to use efficiently the
limited bandwidth, e.g., to target only a particular tag population or switch off completely some
readers. Finally, as RFID communication protocols use dedicated privacy enhancing features [40],
the RFID middleware will also need to support their use. For instance, the RFID middleware
must provide the right kill-password to the right reader to apply it on the tag as specified in
EPC standard.
Our contributions in this paper can be summarized as follows. First, we address some pri-
vacy concerns in the RFID middleware systems, particularly those implementing the EPCglobal
specifications [13] which is currently one of the predominant standardization efforts of the RFID
community. Second, we propose a fine-grained access and privacy control that we integrate into
the Filtering and Collection middleware. The approach we propose is policy-driven. It extends
our previous work [39] and ensures the following features: (i) enforces a privacy policy without
interfering with the standardized middleware interface, (ii) uses the PrivOrBAC privacy-aware
model [4] to store and manage privacy policy preferences and (iii) takes into account the principles
of declared purpose, consent and accuracy (i.e., collection limitation) as privacy requirements, in
addition to the provisional context, to manage the history of performed actions in the system. To
show the feasibility of our approach, we first provide a proof-of-concept prototype that we apply
on the open-source software for track and trace Fosstrak [17], then, evaluate the performance of
our integrated module in terms of execution time.
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Paper organization. Section 2 discusses related work. Section 3 describes some background
about the EPCglobal middleware and interfaces. Section 4 details the privacy principles that
can be enforced in the middleware. Section 5 exposes our privacy-enhanced middleware solution
and introduces the model we choose to specify the privacy requirements. Section 6 describes our
privacy-enhanced approach applied on Fosstrak. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Related work
In the first levels of the RFID architecture, three types of data deserve to be considered with
security and privacy aspects. We note the reader and tag events [40], the middleware events and
the EPCIS data, after events have been captured and stored (cf. Figure 1 shows a summary view
of the EPCglobal architecture). We consider that the reader interface is part of the middleware
interface as the two roles are in the “middle” of the architecture and relatively play the same role
with different levels of abstraction [10].
While security research in the context of RFID has mainly focused on reader to tag communica-
tion [16,22,?] and RFID-based data repositories [3,18,35] and more global communication services
such as the RFID discovery service [25,26] (cf. Figure 1), the middleware level has not received
much attention so far. Most of the middleware implementations available today are commercial-
based [21]. There are also some middlewares which have been developed for research purposes,
such as [17] and [20]. However, most widely deployed middleware products do not fully consider
the security requirements when processing sensitive data. For example, several implementations
from software vendors [19,30] and specialized companies [32] and open source initiatives [17] of-
fering RFID middleware functions, manage the access control to historical events stored into final
databases. However, they do not provide treatments to enhance privacy policies (e.g., by access
control techniques) in accordance with international regulations, expected to be done at the mid-
dleware level [14]. The same issue is observed in some research works for securing the middleware
level. For instance, authors in [37] provide an Application Level Events Service Security Com-
ponent (ALE-SSC) to strengthen security and trust in the ALE-based service middleware. The
proposed mechanism is only to protect transported data between the middleware and its clients.
In [36], the authors provide techniques to support context-aware access control service in the mid-
dleware. The context information, in this case, is meant to be the reliability of the requester and
the environment.
Regarding the EPCglobal standard, most existing implementations support its use. In case
they include security mechanisms, they explicitly provide it in the EPCIS (EPC Information Ser-
vice) level [19,30,32] relying mostly on role based access control and encryption models. Some of
these aforementioned products include security enhancements into their middleware implementa-
tions [19,30]. However, few works focus on privacy problems. An exception is the work [20], where
the authors propose to support the EPCglobal middleware via a tool called Privacy Framework
Tool plug-in. This tool includes privacy friendly practices and audits to be applied to the proposed
middleware. To the best of our knowledge, there have been neither public communication related
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to the used privacy policy nor information about the plug-in implementation. We also note the
work in [5] that provides security and privacy features included in the middleware, which is referred
as data processing layer. In this work, the authors enforce the middleware privacy by policy based
management. According to the authors, the privacy policy specifies whether an application has the
right to access RFID tag data, track it over time, and use it to generate events. It is not mentioned
that the privacy policy has considered the privacy principles of declared purpose, accuracy and
consent, issued from known regulations.
To conclude, RFID interfaces that govern the middleware today propose a role based access
control as a security approach. However, they fail to address consumer privacy concerns by sup-
porting appropriately known regulations and guidelines [2]. A possible reason for this issue is that
most enterprises run the RFID middleware in an internal network [15]. In addition, as explained
in [7], the efforts to achieve security and privacy exist in the middleware but not as an architectural
incorporation for RFID middlewares; rather as domain specific security rules, implemented up to
compliance to specific solutions. Finally, in terms of performance, there is no standard metric that
can be used to study individual middleware implementation and compare the existing solutions
among each other. This is due to the limited available information on the performance parameters
of these solutions, especially commercial middleware systems. On the other hand, the unavailabil-
ity of real world data for a large-scale RFID deployment affects the analysis of research middleware
systems with real world application scenarios.
In this paper, we propose the use of the PrivOrbac service [4] to implement the role based access
control proposed by the EPCglobal standard specifications. EPCglobal has already specified in
the middleware level, an API of access control. The proposed model is Role Based Access Control
(RBAC) to define rules for granting or denying access to methods or resources proposed by other
APIs. The security mechanism of the access control API limits the access to critical methods (e.g.,
subscription to capture tag data). Nevertheless, it does not cope with data aggregation details and
filtered and combined reports in a same request. In addition, the privacy principles of purpose,
accuracy and consent, issued from known regulations are not considered, as PrivOrbac does. We
believe that a fine-grained security on these collected data for privacy concerns has to be handled
in the middleware level to prevent applications, even in the same organization, from collecting
data that undermine people’s private lives or reputations.
In the sequel, we show how it is possible to integrate a privacy controller on the top of a
middleware solution to satisfy the basic principles of privacy, without interfering with the existing
specifications of the EPCglobal standard. We evaluate our proposal in terms of execution time and
compare it with the original middleware solution implemented in Fosstrak.
3 The EPCglobal middleware and its interface
The EPCglobal network, initially proposed by the MIT’s Auto-ID Center [34] and further developed
by members of the joint-venture EPCglobal, is currently one of the predominant standardization
efforts of the RFID community. The EPCglobal network is a set of global technical standards
aiming at enabling automatic and instant identification of individual items and sharing this infor-
mation throughout the supply chain. The Filtering & Collection (F&C) middleware is one of the
main components of the EPCglobal network architecture [6]. It uses a single interface to a large
number of distributed readers and a large number of capturing applications that may be interested
in the collected data. This interface is called the Application Level Event (ALE) (cf. Figure 2).
ALE 1.1 comprises five standard APIs, namely Reading, Writing, Tag Memory, Logical Reader
and Access Control APIs. In this paper, we are interested in the Reading API which provides a
means for clients (i.e., Capturing applications) to specify in a high-level, declarative way, what tag
data they are interested in and gives the corresponding reports in variety of ways.
It is undisputed that the act of reading out one or more RFID tags constitutes a data col-
lection. This means that existing privacy regulations and laws (cf. Section 4.1) also apply to the
communication involving the RFID middleware responsible for configuring RFID readers for data
collection. In the sequel, we present the main information that an EPC tag carries and give in
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more detail, the role played by the Reading API of the middleware interface. Subsequently, we
present the limits of this interface regarding privacy controls.
3.1 Information handled by the RFID/EPC tag
Electronic Product Code is an example of RFID code. It is a numbering scheme that provides a
unique identification for physical objects and assemblies. The information about these numbers is
not stored in the code, but serves as a reference to Internet-based information. There are many
situations where the code stored in an RFID tag is considered as a sensitive information, e.g., in a
context where people fear to be tracked or refuse that their belongings are read. Other information
may be stored in the additional memory of the tag (i.e., depending on the tag type). They are
extracted by the tag Memory API of the ALE.
The EPC is mostly a 96-bit code [9] divided into four fixed partitions, cf. Figure 3. First,
the 8-bit header defines the number, type and length of subsequent data partitions. Second, the
manager code defines the manufacturer of the item. The next 24-bits defines the object type code.
Finally, the 36-bits unique object defines the identification (or serial) number.
Since the EPC was made to integrate existing numbering schemes, different headers can be
used in the EPC technology, e.g., the well known Global Trade Identification Number (GTIN) that
is widely used in the retail industry. A special version of GTIN (i.e., UPC Version B) supported
by EPC, originally intended to handle the National Drug Code and National Health Related Item
Codes. Since the meaning of this code may reveal personal information, it presents some privacy
concerns when read without the consent of the tag holder, i.e., the patient. This unauthorized
reading can be handled in the middleware via the ALE interface. Let us see the ALE main actions
and data types.
3.2 Application Level Events (ALE) interface
One or more clients (named also capturing applications) can request the ALE interface [10] via a
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or asynchronously a result. To receive asynchronous results, the ALE clients have to subscribe
to an already defined specification ECSpec (see next paragraph) and to specify a Uniform Re-
source Identifier (URI). This URI describes the client address to which the information is delivered,
e.g., subscribe(ECSpec, URI).
3.2.1 Primary data types
The primary data types associated with the Reading API of ALE are the Event Cycle Specification
(ECSpec) and the Event Cycle Reports (ECReports). ECSpec is an XML type used to specify how
an event cycle is to be elaborated and reported. ECReports is an XML type containing one or
more reports which are generated from one execution of an ECSpec. ECSpec can be triggered
in two ways: (1) A standing ECSpec is performed using the define method. Subsequently, one or
more clients subscribe to that ECSpec using the subscribe or the poll method. (2) An immediate
execution of the ECSpec is submitted via the immediate method.
3.2.2 Event Cycle Specification (ECSpec)
ECSpec describes an event cycle specification and defines the generated view that could result in
a privacy threats (see Section 4.2). It contains three main parts :
- Logical readers or a list of readers (ECLogicalReaders). Each member of this list is either a
name of a single reader or a composite reader used to read tags.
- Boundary Spec. A specification of how the boundaries of event cycles are to be determined
(ECBoundarySpec). They specify the start and stop conditions or the duration or the repetition
period of the event cycle.
- Reports specifications (ECReportSpec). Each report specifies one output to be generated from
the event cycle and to be included in the list of reports. Its main fields are:
– include/exclude patterns to filter what tags are to be included in the final report. A single EPC
pattern is a URI-formatted string that denotes a single EPC or a set of EPCs.
– grouping pattern defines how filtered tags are grouped for reporting. This parameter separates
tags into different groups and is only used when some output format are set.
– report set is an enumerated type that specifies the set of tags to be considered for the output.
i.e., EPCs read in the current event cycle, additions or deletions from the previous event cycle.
– output format specifies how the final set of EPCs is to be reported. If includeCount is true,
the report includes also a count of the EPCs in the final set for each group.
3.3 Privacy control limitations in the middleware
EPCglobal has proposed an ALE API of access control to use the functionalities of the F&C
middleware. This API allows administrative clients to define the access rights of other clients
when using the methods and resources proposed by other ALE APIs (e.g., reading, writing to the
tag memory). The model is role based access control [33] (RBAC). A role maps to one or more
permissions to a particular feature of the ALE API. Two kinds of permissions exist: the function
permissions and the data permissions. The first one grants the right to use a particular method
of the ALE API (e.g., define, subscribe, unsubscribe), whereas the latter grants the right to use a
particular resource or data (e.g., the right to govern a particular reader). The security mechanism
of the access control API limits the accesses to critical methods (i.e., subscription to capture tag
data) but does not cope with data aggregation details and filtered/combined reports in a request
specification. For this aim, we propose to add a new layer on top of the middleware component that
controls the collection performed by the middleware clients. Before delving into the details of our
privacy controller proposition, we deal with privacy principles provided by relevant regulations,
specifically those that can be handled in the middleware level.
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4 Introducing the privacy principles
We present the privacy principles that can be handled in the middleware level, then cross them
with each field of the ECSpec to extract those we have to focus on to enforce privacy in the
middleware level.
4.1 Privacy principles in the middleware
Global System 1 has developed the EPC/RFID Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) tool to help
companies uncover the privacy risks and perform their own privacy assessments when implement-
ing their RFID applications [12]. These privacy recommendations are defined in accordance with
relevant privacy and data protection laws and regulations [14]. Based on these directives, we de-
fine the main privacy principles in RFID environments, as (1) Purpose specification (2) Collection
limitation (3) Data owner access (4) Notification of the data owner (named also openness) (5)
Explicit consent (6) Security mechanisms (7) Collection relevance. Some of these principles can
be expanded in the middleware level while others are dropped to suit its specifications. These
latter could be rather enforced in upper levels. We summarize in Table 1 the privacy requirements
that can be achieved in the F&C middleware. Here, we are interested in the explicit consent, the
purpose and the accuracy principles.
4.2 Privacy principles in ECSpec
Table 2 shows the privacy principles that can be treated in each ECSpec field. Note that it is
better to specify the purpose of the data collection apart from the ECSpec (cf. Section 5). The
configuration of one reader or a list of readers, named logical readers, can directly influence the
received reports. The use of a non-authorized reader can result in collecting non-authorized state
information (e.g., monitoring the number of items in a defined area) or in providing a localization
service (e.g., applied to cases of smart rooms). The use of a list of readers is mainly viewed in
scenarios of tracking an item or a person. For privacy reasons, the configuration of this field should
be treated to obtain accurate results. The specification of the boundaries is important from a
privacy point of view, e.g, for start/stop trigger conditions, if the person is moving from/to an
assumed private place, this event could be a trigger to start/stop tracking the person. The duration
declares the period of time during which the EPC tags are authorized to be identified. For privacy
reasons, the configuration of the temporal consent is required. Finally, the specification of the
reports fields affects the data view. For accurate results, the process of reading can be treated by
including and excluding some EPC tags using some regular expressions [10] or by only reporting
a set of tags grouped by an EPC code field. In the sequel, we present our solution and the privacy
policy model we use to specify our rules.
5 Privacy enforcement in the RFID middleware
The privacy controller module integrated in the EPCglobal middleware is depicted in Figure 4.
Relying on the ALE interactions for reading tags (cf. Section 3.2) and the privacy principles
Table 1 Privacy Principles in the Middleware Level
Privacy Principle Middleware support
(1) Purpose specification to announce the valid purpose associated with the request.
(2) Collection limitation (Accuracy) to ensure that only necessary information is collected by holding the
accuracy and anonymity specifications in the ECSpec filter.
(5) Explicit consent to ensure that the data is collected with the knowledge and consent
of the data owner.
(6) Security mechanisms to protect personal data from unauthorized access or disclosure (e.g.,
encryption, anonymity).





















Fig. 4 EPCglobal middleware with a privacy controller module
required at this level (cf. Section 4.1), we consider that the subscription to an ECSpec is the
action concerned with the privacy issues (the same for the other request modes). In fact, the
collection of data is only triggered by this action, since the defined ECSpec is not executed before
the subscription is made. The other activities (e.g., the definition of an ECSpec) could be controlled
by classical access control policies. Therefore the privacy controller is triggered once a subscription
request is received from the client, with a declaration of the collection purpose.
Regarding the purpose declaration, it can either be added to the ECSpec content or as a pa-
rameter with the subscribe request. We add the purpose to the subscribe request for the following
reasons. First, this way, the ECSpec can be used by many capturing applications and with possi-
bly different purposes. Second, adding the purpose parameter to the subscription request avoids
distorting the ECSpec and leaves it consistent with the EPCglobal standard specification. When
triggered by the client subscription, the privacy controller calls the privacy policy database, where
the data owner preferences are stored. It compares these entered preferences and the content of
the ECSpec request and should be able to decide whether to grant or deny the collection of the
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specified data or to update the ECSpec (cf., Section 5.3.2). The accuracy principle is rather han-
dled when focusing on the content of the ECSpec request. We begin by presenting the model we
have chosen, to specify the privacy rules that we apply to a motivating scenario. Then, we delve
into the details of our privacy controller module and its interations.
5.1 Privacy policy specification
There are several models of privacy in the literature. These models are used to model and integrate
privacy requirements into a security policy [4,27,29,43]. The security policy is generally specified
according to an access control model to simplify the upgrade of existing information systems. Here,
we detail the privacy principles of the PrivOrBAC model [4], which extends the Organization-
Based Access Control model [23] (OrBAC) by reusing most of its implemented mechanisms, e.g.,
managing the security policy by specifying the contexts as complex conditions to define privacy
control requirements. The choice of PrivOrBAC relies on its capacity to handle most of the privacy
principles appearing in the guidelines and recommendations previously mentioned, e.g., principles
of consent, accuracy, purpose of data collection; but of course it can be substituted with another
privacy model without disrupting the whole process.
5.1.1 The OrBAC model
The OrBAC model is a generic and expressive access control model that extends the Role Based
Access Control [33] (RBAC) model. OrBAC provides a set of concepts to express the security policy
and enables making distinction between an abstract policy specifying organizational requirements
and its concrete implementation in a given information system. Abstract organization privileges,
such as permission, are expressed through the predicate Permission(org, r, a, v, c). It means that
the organization org grants a permission to role r to realize the activity a on the view v in the
context c.
When declaring a context, a subject obtains some specific permissions and possibly some
obligations or prohibitions. For instance, a subject empowered in the role nurse may be permitted
to declare that she is performing an inspection. By doing so, this subject will get the permission
to have an access to the tag data that are in relation with her service. PrivOrBAC reuses these
concepts and specializes them in specific contexts to handle the required privacy principles.
5.1.2 Privacy contextual management
PrivOrBAC models the explicit consent as a context, the purpose as a user declared context and
the different views as an accuracy of the objects, which could be defined by the data owner as
preferences. The data owner preferences are included into the security policy of the organization.
The Consent Principle: We define (i) the consent preference view and (ii) the consent context.
For (i), users store their consent preferences in the consent preference view (cp). Each object in
this view corresponds to a particular data owner preference and has four attributes: Dataowner,
Recipient (who receives the data related to the object), Target (the requested object), and Need-
Consent (a Boolean parameter, which is set to true when the data owner consent is needed).
(ii) The consent context takes into account the data owner preferences and/or notifies him when
his personal information is accessed. Two cases are identified. The first case is when the consent is
needed (NeedConsent = true). The data owner response is modeled by a built-in predicate Con-
sent response. That is, if org is an organization, s is a subject, do is a data owner, resp ∈ {accept,
deny}, then Consent response(org, do, s, cp, resp) is the response returned by the data owner to
the organization. The second case is when the consent of the data owner is not required before
revealing his private data to the recipient. In this case, the NeedConsent(cp) attribute is false.
The access decision can be made without waiting for the Consent response. By this means, the
Dataowner chooses which view the Recipient can access.
The Purpose Principle The purpose is modeled as a user-declared context. Each data owner
can create purpose objects to specify the purposes for which access to his personal objects are
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allowed. The purpose objects belonging to a finite set of PO are grouped and inserted in a purpose
view. Purpose values range over the domain PV (e.g., Medical research, Inspection). Each purpose
object has two attributes:
- Recipient, which is a predicate over domains PO x S defining who takes advantage of the
declared purpose. That is, if po is a purpose object belonging to PO and s is a subject, then
Recipient(po,s) means that s is the subject who takes advantage of the declared purpose po.
- Declared purpose, which is a predicate over domains PO x PV, associating a purpose value
with the declared purpose object. That is, if po is a purpose object and pv is a purpose value,
then Declared purpose(po, pv) means that pv is the purpose value associated with the declared
purpose po.
By inserting a po in his purpose subview, a data owner declares that another subject (a Recipient)
will perform some activity in a given context.
The Accuracy Principle Privacy enforcement requires the use of different levels of accuracy
depending on the purpose and the subject requesting the collection of the private data. This
principle is consistent with the privacy directive of collection limitation. Private objects of each
data owner may have different levels of accuracy [4]. We can consider a hierarchy between the
root view of a data owner that groups the initially collected objects and their sub-views. These
sub-views group the derived objects that have different accuracies. We recall that Sub view is
a relation over domains Org x V x V, if org is an organization, and v1 and v2 are views, then
Sub view(org, v1, v2) means that in organization org, view v1 is a sub-view of v2. Each data
owner defines his own private data hierarchy, composed of different data views, e.g., a view of the
EPC codes or a view of the EPC quantity. The data owner can then specify different privacy and
security rules for each view.
5.1.3 Provisional context
Provisional context applies after specifying the privacy policy. It is used to model security rules
whose activation depends on the history of previous actions performed by the subscriber. For this
purpose, we first assume that the information system manages a log, that stores data about previous
activities of the users in the system. This is modeled by a view called Log. Objects belonging to
view Log have six attributes: actor, action, target, activity, context and date that respectively
represents the subject (actor) who is performing an action (action) on an object (target) within
an activity (activity) in a context (context) at a given date (date).
In the sequel, we specify our privacy rules using the PrivOrBAC model applied to a motivating
scenario.
5.2 Motivating scenario
This section illustrates a scenario in a Hospital Ho for a remote monitoring system. To define the
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Fig. 5 Scenario of monitoring applications
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The elderly patient Bob is remotely monitored at home from different services of the Hospital
(cf. Figure 5). Bob suffers from hypertension and from alzheimer. The medications he daily takes
are put in his medication shelf and are identified with EPC codes, i.e., every one pill is related
to one EPC code. The nurse of the cardiology service has to monitor Bob twice a day. Every
time he takes his hypertension medication from the shelf, the total number of pills decreases. The
nurse has not to track the tags that are related to the alzheimer disease. This latter information
is considered as private with respect to the patient preferences. In the other side, the Pharmacy
application has to monitor the medication shelf twice a week, to check if it contains the required
number of medications. Thus, it only needs a quantity information about the medications rather
than their entire EPC code. It is also possible for the Pharmacy application to have access to the
patients number suffering from the alzheimer’s disease, if their names are unknown.
Based on these assumptions, the nurse of cardiology service has only the right to access objects
of type C, i.e., the control is done over the field object code of the EPC code (cf. Figure 3),
describing the reference of the hypertension medication. The ECSpec is configured to only consider
deletions set of tags, i.e., tags deleted from the previous event cycle. Finally, the pharmacist is
only permitted to view the tags quantity depending on their manager code. Exceptionally, he has
the permission to know the number of patients suffering from an alzheimer, without knowing their
names. For this aim, he can specify in his request a fixed EPC manager and object codes related
to this disease. Since this information is considered as private if both the disease and the patient
name are learned by the pharmacist, the provisional context will also be triggered to check for
historical requests.
OrBAC specification:
The privacy rules corresponding to the motivating scenario are expressed in the OrBAC model as
follows:
(1) the nurse related to the cardiology application is only permitted to receive data of patients
suffering from hypertension, with the context Consent nurse and the view TagC type in the user-
declared context patient nurse:
Rule1 = Permission(Ho, NurseApp, Subscribe, TagC type, Consent nurse) where the context Con-
sent nurse is specified as,
Ruleconsent 1 : ∀ Ho ∈ Org, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀α ∈ A, ∀ o ∈ O, ∀ cp ∈ O, Hold(Ho, s, α, o, Consent nurse)
← Use(Ho, cp, Consent preference)∧ Recipient(cp,s) ∧ Target(cp, o) ∧ Dataowner(cp, do) ∧ (¬
NeedConsent(cp) ∨ Consent response(Ho, do, s, cp, accept)).
That is, the Consent nurse context holds if there is an object cp belonging to the Con-
sent preference view which has the attributes s and NeedConsent(cp).
Rule2= Permission(Ho, NurseApp, Subscribe, TagC type, User declared(patient nurse)) where the
context patient nurse is defined as follows:
∀ Ho ∈ Org, ∀ s, s’ ∈ S, ∀α ∈ A, ∀ po ∈ PO, ∀ pv ∈ PV, Hold(Ho, s, α, po, User declared(pa-
tient nurse))← Use(Ho, po, do-purpose) ∧ PatientID(po,s’) ∧ Recipient(po,s) ∧
Declared purpose(po,pv) ∧ Nurse(s’,s).
That is, in the organization Ho, a subject s performs an action α on the purpose object po in
the context patient nurse if there is a purpose object po used in the subview do-purpose of the
data owner (associated with his defined objects) by Ho such that s is the recipient associated with
po (represented by the application-dependent predicate Recipient(po,s)) and s is the nurse of the
patient s’. cf. Section 5.1.2, for details.
(2) the pharmacy application is only permitted to receive data of the patient, with the context
Consent pharmacist and the view AllTagNumber in the user-declared context patient pharmacy :
Rule3= Permission(Ho, PharmacyApp, Subscribe, AllTagNumber, Consent pharmacist) where the
context Consent pharmacist is specified by:
Ruleconsent 2: ∀ Ho ∈ Org, ∀ s ∈ S, ∀α ∈ A, ∀ o, cp ∈ O, Hold(Ho, s, α, o, Consent pharmacist)
← Use(Ho, cp, Consent preference)∧ Recipient(cp,s) ∧ Target(cp, o) ∧ Dataowner(cp, do) ∧ (¬
NeedConsent(cp) ∨ Consent response(Ho,do,s,cp,accept)).
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That is, the Consent pharmacist context holds if there is an object cp belonging to the Consent-
preference view, which has the attributes s and NeedConsent(cp).
Rule4= Permission(Ho, PharmacyApp, Subscribe, AllTagNumber, User declared(patient pharmacist))
where the context patient pharmacist is defined as follows:
∀ Ho ∈ Org, ∀ s, s’ ∈ S, ∀α ∈ A, ∀ po ∈ PO, ∀ pv ∈ PV, Hold(Ho, s, α, po, patient phar-
macist)← Use(Ho, po, do-purpose) ∧ PatientID(po,s’) ∧ Recipient(po,s) ∧ Declared purpose(po,pv)
∧ Pharmacist(s’,s).
That is, in the organization Ho, a subject s performs an action α on the purpose object po
in the context patient pharmacist if there is a purpose object po used in the subview do-purpose
of the data owner such that s is the recipient associated with po and s is the pharmacist of the
patient s′.
It is assumed that the patient (i.e., the data owner) has already declared the contexts pa-
tient nurse, patient pharmacist, Consent nurse and Consent pharmacy.
Finally, the pharmacist has the permission to learn the number of patients who are suffering
from the alzheimer disease, without specifying their names in the same request or in a previous
executed request. To model this rule, we define a provisional context called Alzeimer− statistics
as follows:
∀ s ∈ S, ∀α ∈ A, ∀ o, (Hold(Ho,s, α,o, Alzeimer − statistics) ← ∃ l, Use(Ho,l,Log) ∧ actor(l,s)
∧¬activity(l, Consult-NameMemoryField) ∧ (context(l, Checking−patients))
That is, in Ho, subject s performs action α on object o in provisional context Alzeimer −
statistics if there is not activity Consult-NameMemoryF ield that was logged in view Log in
context of Cheking-patients with subject s as an actor.
Note that the roles nurse and pharmacist are managed by the access control API of the ALE
middleware interface. In the following section, we describe our new privacy control module and
the related algorithms.
5.3 Privacy controller activities
5.3.1 Privacy controller interactions
To subscribe to an event cycle and receive related reports, the client calls, via the ALE interface, an
entity responsible for reports generation, referred here as CentralEntity, (cf. Figure 6). We define
the PrivacyController as the entity handling the compliance of the subscription requests with the
predefined privacy policy.
Figure 6 depicts the relation between the two defined entities (i.e., CentralEntity and Privacy-
Controller). The CentralEntity instantiates the PrivacyController with the specification ECSpec,
the recipient address URI and the purpose to verify the properties of the request. The Privacy-
Controller outputs a Grant or Deny of access to the specified data after calling the privacy policy,
otherwise updates the ECSpec for accurate results. The methods supported by the PrivacyCon-
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Fig. 6 Privacy controller activities
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Regarding the privacy preferences, the data owner specifies them using the PrivOrBAC model [4]
depending on the privacy principles enforced in the system. These preferences are introduced in
a predefined ontology. As shown in Figure 7, each data owner preference is associated with a
recipient address and a purpose on which the preference is defined. This preference turns around
a set of targeted objects (targets) that the recipient aims to access. A decision attribute, related
to each target, defines whether the data owner gives his consent to access the data or not. In
the positive case, the decision attribute designates the accuracy in which the data will be dis-
closed. Note that the final decision has to be in accordance with general privacy rules of relevant
regulations, which are initially specified in PrivOrBAC.
As an illustration, we apply our Privacy controller methods to the motivating example, pre-
sented in Section 5.2. Figure 8 represents the preferences of the data owner as implemented in
PrivOrBAC. Recall that for the cardiology nurse, the patient Bob decides to disclose only his
medications of type C in clear (i.e., the entire EPC code) for the purpose Cardio control. Regard-
ing the pharmacist application, the patient Bob allows the collection of all the tags information
but with a numbering view depending on their EPC manufacturer field. In the two cases, the
purpose should be declared along with the subscription. In more details, according to the privacy
policy, if the ECSpec of the nurse application, only contains the type C medications as a target,
and the specified duration is in accordance with the time constraints, the collection of the data is
authorized with a valid purpose. If the Nurse requests for more EPC objects as targets, these latter
are updated in accordance with the data owner preference, by changing the defined pattern for
this field. For example, the pattern entered in the ECSpec : urn:epc:pat:sgtin-96:0000389.*.*,
is replaced by urn:epc:pat:sgtin-96:0000389.1234.*, to specifically designate an object of type
1234. The same update is done over the duration field. Note that the representation of the EPC
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Fig. 8 Privacy preferences in the motivating scenario
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Algorithm 1 Subscribe to an ECSpec
Input: ECSpec spec, purpose purp, recipient URI
1: NewSubscriber ← URI
2: if (PrivacyController.verify(spec, URI, purp)) then
3: ECSpec spec’ ← PrivacyController.update(spec)
4: if spec’ != Null then
5: spec ← spec’
6: SubscribersLIST.put(URI)
7: else
8: ALEMessage ← No update to be performed
9: end if
10: else
11: ALEMessage ← The URI has not the right to subscribe to ECSpec with the purpose purp
12: end if
5.3.2 Privacy control for subscriptions
The PrivacyController is defined as an independent entity that CentralEntity calls for new
subscriptions. Our PrivacyController entity uses two main methods: Verify to check the subscrip-
tion parameters, i.e., the purpose, the ECSpec name and the logical reader field and Update to
change the ECSpec, when needed.
The Verify method returns a boolean:
– False when the entered parameters are not correct, e.g., the specified purpose and logical reader
are not adequate for this access,
– True when the subscription to the ECSpec is entirely allowed (e.g., already existing in a defined
database) or when it is allowed but with possibly, further filtering for privacy reasons, e.g., more
EPC targets than allowed are specified. In this latter case, the Update method is called.
The Update method updates the ECSpec content with the corresponding data owner prefer-
ences. It compares the ECSpec fields entered by the recipient and the preferences of the data
owner, then updates each field of the ECSpec, except the logical readers, which could be rather
updated using the the logical reader API, cf. Section 3. At the end, the Update method checks for
the correctness of the resulted ECSpec spec’. In the case spec’ is not correct, the method outputs
Null, meaning that no changes are performed on the ECSpec, and an empty report is generated.
Algorithm 1 shows the subscribe method that could be included in the CentralEntity. Steps 2
and 3 verify the existence of an already subscribed recipient, identified by its URI address with the
same ECSpec. Step 5 verifies the permission of the recipient to subscribe to the report notifications
with the entered ECSpec and purpose. In the positive case (Step 3), a call to the Update method
is performed. If the output of the Update method is True (cf. Step 4), then the original ECSpec
is required to be updated with a new filtered ECSpec. Step 6 adds the address URI to the list of
validated subscribers in case of permission. Note that for checking the correctness, some general
criteria should be satisfied by any updating algorithm, to generate sound, maximum and secure
results [41]. For example, if the period of reading tags specified by the subscriber is different from
the period specified by the data owner, the minimum of the two values is considered. Thus, the
subscription is not rejected and the criteria of maximality is applied.
6 Privacy controller integration in Fosstrak
To implement our privacy-enhanced module, we use the open-source Fosstrak platform [17]. Fos-
strak implements the standardized roles and interfaces published by EPCglobal. Fosstrak provides
a generic middleware solution for large-scale deployment using a modular approach. It is also
viewed as the most well addressed middleware solution among the research based middleware in
terms of description of the solution and different interactions, which serves as a basis for other
new implementations [20]. The Fosstrak platform consists of three separate modules: the reader
module, the filtering and collection middleware module, and the EPCIS module, which deals with
interpretation of the captured RFID data in an application context. Each of the three modules
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implements the corresponding roles in the EPCglobal network, as well as the interface specifica-
tions of the reader protocol, the ALE (version 1.1) and the EPC Information System Query and
Capture interfaces. In Fosstrak, the interfaces to request the ALE and readers are modeled in the
WebServices Description Language1 (WSDL). To communicate with RFID readers, the Fosstrak
ALE middleware uses the EPCglobal LLRP [11] (Low Level Reader Protocol). For readers that do
not support LLRP, the ALE middleware uses the Fosstrak Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL).
We frame our work in the middleware module, the key location where the configuration of
events to be collected is performed and related reports are generated.
6.1 Fosstrak EventCycle and ReportsGenerators
An EventCycle entity in Fosstrak is constructed according to an event cycle specification, EC-
Spec. Whenever a client defines a new event cycle (ECSpec) through the ALE interface, a new
ReportsGenerator will be also created along an EventCycle. Upon creation, the EventCycle entity
aquires the readers from the logical reader API. As soon as a client subscribes to the EventCycle,
a ReportsGenerator entity starts the EventCycle. Then, tags are read and data are returned to the
ReportsGenerator.
In point of fact, a capturing application does not subscribe to an EventCycle to receive its
specified events, rather the subscription is done through the associated ReportsGenerator. The
ReportsGenerator is the central entity ensuring that the EventCycle is started/stopped and that
subscribers receive the resulting tags information. Therefore, the ReportsGenerator acts as a gate-
way for clients to the EventCycle.
6.2 Privacy controller implementation in Fosstrak
We have modified the Fosstrak filtering and collection server (fc-server) version 1.2.0, implemented
in Java language, as well as the Web-based client to support the purpose attribute as an entry
along with the ECSpec and the URI address. In the fc-server, we have mainly changed the Re-
portsGenerator implementation and all the classes related to it. More specifically, we have added
the PrivacyController class and its methods into the Fosstrak filtering and collection server and
changed the subscribe method of the ReportsGenerator class. We have also changed the fc-
common directory of the Fosstrak middleware to integrate exception treatments in relation with
the right to collect the data. To take into account these changes, a compilation of the server as
a Web application ARchive (WAR) file is needed. For more details about the modified Fosstrak
code, please refer to [38].
6.3 Testing scenario and results
To test the whole process of the filtering and collection of EPC events, all roles and interfaces di-
rectly related to the EPCglobal middleware (cf. Figure 4) should be well configured and connected.
We consider the EPCglobal Low Level Reader Protocol [11] (LLRP) to ensure the communication
between the F&C middleware and the different readers. Readers should also support the same pro-
tocol. We use the LLRPCommander tool 2 that helps configuring and managing LLRP-compliant
RFID readers. To simulate LLRP readers and generate tag data, we consider the reader emulator
Rifidi3. The ALE clients (i.e., capturing application) are simulated by the middleware Web client
application, which comes with the Fosstrak platform.
Regarding the management of the data owners preferences, the PrivOrBAC policy is stored in
a dedicated server and users preferences are accessed via a web service [31] using the REpresenta-
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As for the provisional rules, since collected data are not meant to be stored in the middleware
level, we need at least to store a log of representative number of requests [1]. The aim is to search
for previously performed actions in the history, to decide whether to activate or not a present
action (e.g., a permission to read a particular information). In our approach, we do not store the
requests that are initially sent by the capturing application, as proposed in the last version of
Fosstrak. Rather, we store the rewritten requests to apply our privacy control on the effective
launched requests.
6.3.1 Sequence diagram
In order to generate the event cycle reports, an ALE Client should subscribe to a set of events
specified in its entered event cycle specification ECSpec. To visualize the new messages flow related
to the subscription activity, Figure 9 depicts a sequence diagram including the privacy controller
module we have integrated into the Fosstrak platform. We assume that the client and the recipient
of the report represent the same entity. The goal is to receive the reports corresponding to the client
specification, when the context holds with the rules defined in the privacy policy. In the sequel,




























Fig. 9 Sequence diagram related to subscriptions
1: The Client subscribes to an EventCycle, by entering the ECSpec (assumed to be already cre-
ated), the recipient address (URI), and the purpose (from a purpose list). Figures 12 and 13 in
the Appendix, respectively illustrate the ECSpecs of the nurse and the pharmacist applications
rendered into XML files. In the case of the nurse application, the EPC code partition 0000389
refers to the manager code for a given corporation, and the partition 000162 denotes the product
code for hypertension medication (Type C), where GTIN-96 tag encoding is used. The reportSet
field is set to DELETIONS, to only detect deleted tags from the shelf1 reader.
We assume that the nurse is only interested in the epc code, which matches the Type C
tag, regardless of its serial number. In the second case, the pharmacist subscribes to an ECSpec
considering only count view of tags grouped by their manager code. The subscription considers
the current DELETIONS state of shelf1.
2: The ALE subscribes the Client to the ReportsGenerator that exclusively corresponds to the
specified ECSpec (either for the nurse or the pharmacist applications).
3.1: The ReportsGenerator instantiates the PrivacyController to verify the content of the request
depending on the privacy policy.
3.2: In the case, the purpose and the logical reader of the new ECSpec are authorized and an
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updating process is handled to verify if the remaining fields of the ECSpec correspond to the
privacy policy.
4.1/4.1.1: The PrivacyController checks the Client request. When the request does not meet the
privacy policy (e.g., more than the Type C medication is specified for that URI Recipient), or if
the updated ECSpec is not correct, a deny message is returned to the ALE interface stating that
the privacy policy does not allow the present subscription.
4.2: The PrivacyController checks the request and possibly updates it. In the present case, the
access is granted, and therefore, the PrivacyController allows the ReportsGenerator related to this
event cycle to continue the processing.
5: The ReportsGenerator starts the EventCycle. The EventCycle now processes tags from the
readers.
6/7: The LogicalReader(s) add(s) Tags to the EventCycle.
8/9: When the EventCycle reaches its boundaries, the reports are generated and sent back to the
Client through the ReportsGenerator.
6.3.2 Obtained results
Regarding the nurse application, results (cf. Figure 14 in the Appendix) show the set of tags that
are read by the shelf1 reader. In the nurse specification (cf. Figure 12 in the Appendix), the nurse
searched to collect either the EPC code epc in the fieldname attribute and a field named age in
the memory content of the tag. This latter field has not been taken into account in the obtained
report, as it is not specified in the data owner preferences. The report (cf. Figure 14) shows that
only EPC tags of type C are collected and presented with their entire code. The DELETION set
specifies that reports must include only the tags that are taken away from the shelf, compared to
the last event cycle.
Concerning the pharmacy application, the outputs (cf. Figure 15 in the Appendix) show only
the quantity of tags in the area of shelf1. This quantity is partitioned in a number of groups
differentiated by the manager code. The last group shows the total tags that are in the frame of
the filter specified in the pharmacist ECSpec (cf. Figure 13 in the Appendix). The CURRENT set of
tags specified in the ECSpec shows the tags presented in the shelf1. In this case, the report is not
updated since it corresponds to the preferences specified by the data owner.
7 Performance evaluation
We evaluate, in this work, the performance of our proposal in terms of execution time. The aim of
our simulations is to measure the total time needed for the middleware to serve all the requests.
For this, we vary the number of simultaneous subscriptions to the middleware from 1 to 50, then,
we consider the maximum response time among all the launched requests. We also consider in this
test that the number of patients managed by the PrivOrBAC server is equal to 100. We compare
our results with the original Fosstrak middleware, i.e., without modifying the ReportsGenerator
entity in the server and the corresponding Capturing application. Note that our simulations are
performed on a PC with Ubuntu OS 64 bits, 2.4 GHz of CPU and 4.0 GB of RAM.
Three scenarios are considered: the first one is named Original scenario, where the privacy
controller is disabled. The second one, named Verif. scenario, performs only a request verification
to check the conformity of the declared purpose and the ECSpec fields with the data owner
preferences (with a call to the PrivOrBAC entity). In this scenario, we assume that there is no
need to update the ECSpec request. The third scenario, named Verif. & Update, performs both
the verification and the update of the ECSpec request according to the privacy policy.
Figure 10 compares the total execution time of the three studied cases (i.e., Original, Verif.,
and Verif. & Update scenarios). As expected, we can notice that the total execution time needed
in the privacy-enhanced middleware to handle all the requests is higher than the original case,
with relevant differences when the number of simultaneous subscriptions (Ns, for short) is high.
This increase is mainly due to the execution time when accessing the PrivOrBAC server, which
grows linearly with Ns (cf. Figure 10). In addition, we can observe that the execution time in the
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Verif. & Update scenario almost coincides with the execution time of the Verif. scenario when Ns
is low (i.e., Ns < 23). The difference between the two scenarios becomes noticeable only when
Ns is high. This means that the update time of the request in our privacy-enhanced middleware
is prominent only at high load (i.e., when the number of simultaneous subscription and ECSpec
updates becomes higher than 33).
Figure 11 further investigates the execution time of the three studied cases in the middleware
without accounting for the time needed to access the PrivOrBAC server. We can see that the
execution time increases with Ns for the three cases. In particular, for both privacy-enhanced
scenarios, the execution time slightly increases compared to the original case when the number
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Enhanced middleware + PrivOrBAC (Verif. & Update scenario)
Fig. 10 Total execution time comparison with PrivOrBAC access (in Msec.)
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Fig. 11 Total execution time comparison without PrivOrBAC access (in Msec.)
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of simultaneous subscriptions is low (i.e., Ns < 23). However, the gap becomes significant as Ns
increases. Indeed, in the Verif. scenario (respectively, the Verif. & Update scenario), the execution
time becomes clearly higher than the time for the original case when Ns ≥ 39 (respectively,
Ns ≥ 23).
It is worth noting that the reported time measurements can be reduced when using a dedicated
server with high computation capabilities, compared to the computer characteristics used for these
simulations.
8 Conclusion
The human-centric deployment of RFID technology today poses several security and privacy con-
cerns, which could adversely affect its wide adoption. We have shown the importance of introducing
security solutions at the early stages of RFID data processing to prevent unintentional disclosures
of sensitive information. In addition, it is undisputed that the act of reading out one or more RFID
tags constitutes a data collection. This means that existing privacy regulations and laws also ap-
ply to the communication involving the RFID middleware, responsible for collecting data. In this
paper, we first addressed some privacy concerns of the EPCglobal technology which is currently
one of the predominant standardization efforts in the RFID community. Second, we provided a
policy-driven approach to enforce privacy in such a technology with principles of declared pur-
pose, accuracy and explicit consent. Also we have added the provisional context control to model
security rules whose activation depends on the history of previously performed actions. Third,
we provided a proof-of-concept prototype that shows the feasibility of our approach. Finally, we
gave some performance evaluation in terms of execution time to compare our privacy enforcement
solution to the Fosstrak original one. As future work, we aim to find a trade-off between the dif-
ferent correctness criteria of our updating algorithm, as in our approach the priority is given to
the maximality criteria. Also, we intend to ensure an end-to-end privacy solution, to complete our
approach, from the reader to the final back-end application.
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Appendix: Specifications and results in XML Files
  








































</ale:ECSpec>   
Fig. 12 ECSpec filtering to obtain Type C tags (nurse application)
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</ale:ECSpec>   
Fig. 13 ECSpec filtering to obtain tags numbers (pharmacist application)
  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<ale:ECReports totalMilliseconds="3000" terminationCondition="DURATION" specName="spec-nurse" date="2013-04-
03T17:31:27.913+02:00" ALEID="ETHZ-ALE-750360204" xmlns:ale="urn:epcglobal:ale:xsd:1" >
<reports> 
<report reportName="report-cardio-nurse"> 
        <group>
<groupList> 
              <member><tag>urn:epc:pat:sgtin-96:3.0000389.000162.1000</tag></member> 
              <member><tag>urn:epc:pat:sgtin-96:3.0000389.000162.1001</tag></member> 
</groupList> 




Fig. 14 ECReports for the cardiology (nurse) application
  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8" standalone="yes"?>
<ale:ECReports totalMilliseconds="3000" terminationCondition="DURATION" specName="spec-pharmacist" 




        <group name="urn:epc:pat:sgtin-96:3.0000389.*.*"> 
<groupCount><count>50</count></groupCount> 
        </group> 
        <group name="urn:epc:pat:sgtin-96:3.0000456.*.*"> 
<groupCount><count>4</count></groupCount> 
       </group> 
       <group>  
<groupCount><count>60</count></groupCount> 




Fig. 15 ECReports for the pharmacist application
